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The paper is focused on the criticisms that theorists of political 
constitutionalism raise against legal constitutionalism, especially 
with regard to the idea of representation and political sovereignty. 
At the same time, the intention is to reconstruct the debate between 
legal and political constitutionalism in contemporary liberalism, 
starting from the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty. This de-
bate concerns two different approaches: the political one rejects the 
idea of judicial review by the Supreme Court because it may 
establish a possible rule of the judges (Michelman; Dworkin). It 
defends the role of Parliament in constitutional matters, in contrast 
with the role of the Supreme Court, inasmuch as – according to them 
– it is not open to political participation. Parliament is considered 
the only place in which we can exercise our constitutional power 
and in which our rights could be adequately protected (Bellamy; 
Waldron; Tushnet; Goldoni). On the other hand, legal constitu-
tionalism upholds the idea of judicial review, defending the role of 
the Supreme Court as “exemplar of public reason” (Rawls 1993). 
This article tries to answer to three fundamental questions about 
constitutional democracy under the banner of political liberalism: 1. 
What do we mean by counter-majoritarian difficulty? 2. What is the 
answer that legal and political model of constitutionalism give to 
this question? 3. What is the role of constitutional courts in demo-
cratic regimes and what is their authority within the State? 
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In The Least Dangerous Branch, Alexander Bickel discusses one of the central 
questions of judicial review: the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty. As he 
wrote, “when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the 
action of an elected executive, it hinders the will of representatives of the actual 
people of the here and now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing 
majority but against it. That, without mystic overtones, is what actually happens 
and it is the reason the charge can be made that judicial review is undemocratic” 
(Ward – Castillo 2005, 124). 
 
“This claim leads scholars to assign great importance to questions of constitutional 
interpretation, and, consequently, the debate about the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty has evolved into a quest to identify judicially enforceable principles. Ac-
cording to this view, the Court gains democratic legitimacy and authority by en-
forceing principles that should supplant those advanced by elected institutions” 
(Ward – Castillo 2005, 3). 
 
According to Bickel, courts – better than legislature or political power – have 
the power to apply and enforce the Constitution, especially in particularly im-
portant moments, against the will of legislative majority. According to some 
scholars, the Court's decisions about the constitutionality or non-constitutionality 
of a legislative act or constitutional amendment cannot be reversed by the 
Parliament or by a legislative majority through an ordinary legislative procedure 
or judicial review could be considered a “deviant institution in the American 
democracy” (Ward – Castillo 2005, 124). The Court is regarded counter-
majoritarian because it requires a special justification for judicial review when the 
Court decides that a law is unconstitutional, and thus striking it down, it exercises 
control against majority, not in its representation (Ward – Castillo 2005, 136). So, 
to present, there are two ways of reasoning. According to the first “empirical” 
way, the Court – in its decisions – reflects public opinion just like other insti-
tutions do. As Kenneth Ward and Cecilia Castillo point out “the Court’s decisions 
are consistent with public opinion nearly two-thirds of the time, making 
‘majoritarian’ a more accurate label for the Court than ‘counter-majoritarian’” 
(Ward – Castillo 2005, 136).  
Additionally, the fact that the Court rules against national opinion up to one-
third of the time does not mark it as unusual or deviant” (Ward – Castillo 2005, 
136). The second reasoning focuses on the idea that the Supreme Court is 
different from other branches of government or other institutions, because it is 
not an elective institution. Its members are not elected by people and when they 
make decisions they do not have to face voters. However, although the Court is 
different from elected institutions and maybe less democratic, it does not mean 
that the Court is less legitimate or totally illegitimate. In this sense, “institutional 
differentiation is a central feature of American democracy. Ironically, the fact that 
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the Court is ‘deviant’ or different from other governing institutions makes it a 
normal and integral part of American democracy” (Ward – Castillo 2005, 138). A. 
Bickel insists that judicial review really weakens democratic processes, only 
because it encourages legislators to shift responsibility of decision-making and 
governance to courts; in this sense, A. Bickel says, “reduced responsibility invites 
legislative negligence because legislators have an incentive to acquiesce in 
unconstitutional demands of their constituents and trust the Court to correct 
their mistakes” (Ward – Castillo 2005).  
Counter-majoritarian difficulty concerns the problem of judicial review, but it 
seems to undercut elected institutions which promote the sense of common life 
that animates a legitimate government; Bickel believes that “judicial review must 
achieve some measure of consonance with democracy” but “he does not believe 
that it can be made democratic” (Ward – Castillo 2005, 150).  
As Richard Bellamy underlines, judicial review is justified as a counter-weight 
to majorities which want to change constitution for their own particular interests. 
In this sense, “Courts are said to avoid such problems through being isolated from 
the electoral process and independent from government interference. Their 
reasoning is guided by legal norms and standards of natural justice inculcated by 
the professional training judges receive, and the expectations and conventions of 
legal and judicial practice and modes of argument” (Bellamy 2013). 
One of the most interesting aspects about the counter-majoritarian difficulty is 
the debate between Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron. Dworkin defends the 
idea of the moral lecture of the Constitution and he maintains the authority of the 
judges as a fundamental element in constitutional democracy. Instead, Waldron 
insists on the idea that a democracy without judicial review would better work, 
satisfy and enforce the values that ground our institutions and our conception of 
justice.  
 
“Both Waldron and Dworkin view judicial review in terms of the broader question 
of how a system of political institutions should make collective decisions. But they 
disagree about whether we should assess judicial review based on the decisions 
that we expect judges to make. While Dworkin contends that judicial review is jus-
tified if judges’ decisions make it more likely that the political community will man-
ifest integrity, Waldron concludes that judicial review offends the value of equality 
that should animate the political process that resolves disagreements about justice. 
According to Waldron, it would offend this value no matter how judges decide 
cases” (Ward – Castillo 2005, 155). 
 
In Dworkin's view, judicial review is considered as consistent with democracy, 
because it increases possibilities for a political community to treat citizens with 
equal concern and respect. In this sense, judicial review works well if judges reach 
decisions that promote social and political cooperation and integrity, if their de-
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cisions reflect the political community's principles of justice and help to enforce 
them. 
Waldron defends judicial authority only if it contributes to a broader political 
process; he remarks that people must develop political institutions to defend po-
litical integrity. As we can see, for Waldron, “in a pluralistic society, people not 
only hold competing conceptions of the good life, they also disagree about justice. 
Therefore, they must develop procedures that can address the conflicts that arise 
from these conditions and can do so in a manner that respects the fact of 
disagreement” (Ward – Castillo 2005). Waldron rejects Dworkin's defence of 
judicial review and he contends that judges do not have this authority.  
According to Waldron, we have a loss of democracy if citizens cannot 
participate in public and political decisions, even though we talk about de-
mocracy. As we read in Ward, in Waldron's opinion, “Dworkin elides the notions 
of a decision about democracy and a decision made by democratic means. 
Waldron believes that this elision prevents Dworkin from accounting for the cost 
to democratic values when a decision about democracy is made through 
nondemocratic means” (Ward – Castillo 2005, 157). So, we can argue that – 
according to Waldron – when nonelected institutions and nonelected officials 
make decisions about democratic system, we have a weaker democracy; leaving 
constitutional power in the hands of the judges means depriving people of its 
most important power; so representative power becomes useless because ci-
tizens cannot exercise it in constitutional matters and democratic values. How-
ever, Waldron does not say that judicial review is not consistent with democracy, 
though he insists that majority rule is the only procedure that resolves con-
troversies about democracy and disagreements about justice, and in order to 
respect citizens´ interest in participating in the discussion this would include 
allowing disagreement about the meaning of democracy itself.  
 
 
Legal constitutionalism and the defence of judicial review 
 
As Marco Goldoni points out, for legal constitutionalism, the relationship between 
law and morality is fundamental; in this sense, the legitimacy of the law derives 
mainly from morality and politics is subject to the law. As he writes, outside the 
limits of legal system, political conflicts would lead to instability and disorder. We 
need the Constitution to guarantee the necessary conditions to have a democratic 
politics; Goldoni argues that “the best way to achieve this aim is to conceive the 
Constitution as a norm which must be applied by the courts. In constitutional 
rights process, first of all, we remove some fundamental principles from ordinary 
political discussion and then, we interpret these principles as outside the 
ordinary political and democratic processes” (Goldoni 2010). 
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Political constitutionalists defend – on one hand – the importance of political 
dimension of constitutionalism and, in this view, the law is subject to politics; on 
the other hand, the importance of political sphere over the law makes us turn our 
attention to the so called input reasons, because they allow people to comment on 
legislative acts and laws that will govern their life (Goldoni 2011). As Goldoni 
highlighted, political constitutionalism rejects some basic characteristics of legal 
constitutionalism: for political one, the relationship between citizens and gov-
ernment is not based on contractualist terms – in which court are guardians of 
constitution – but on direct relationship of trust between people and government. 
At the same time, there are no questions or issues – even of ethical, religious or 
moral nature – that can be legitimately excluded from political debate.  
Legal constitutionalists suggest four reasons to support judicial review. The 
first focuses on the idea that constitutional courts deal with individual cases and 
they are in a better position to decide on individual rights. The second focuses on 
the reference to a bill of rights as a constraint to the judicial interpretation and as 
an “aid allowing disputants to focus on the abstract issues at stake” (Goldoni 
2012). Following Goldoni, we say that “for political constitutionalists, constrains 
imposed by legal texts and precedents, given the vagueness inherent to language 
and the relative case with which courts depart from previous decisions, cannot be 
deemed to be particularly relevant” (Goldoni 2012, 934). For the third reason, we 
highlight that judicial decisions come in the form of reason-giving, but – Goldoni 
argues – this aspect depends on contextual institutional systems and it does not 
belong only to judicial power. The fourth and last reason is based on the idea that 
judicial review is essential to legitimization of a democratic institution and it is 
the only remedy for parliamentarism that protects against the risk of the so-
called “tyranny of majority”. 
 
“As output-based procedure, judicial review can check the risk of majoritarianism 
when democracy, aggregating votes, risks sacrificing individuals to collective 
welfare. Fundamental rights, being ‘individual political goals’, should not be 
subordinated to ‘notions of the general interest’. The claim is that, from the point of 
view of political constitutionalists, judicial review of legislation violates the prin-
ciple of political equality because it decides on issues of general interests as rights 
and powers without giving to every citizen the possibility to participate and to have 
a fair say in the process” (Goldoni 2012, 935). 
  
As Bellamy points out, legal constitutionalism takes certain fundamental con-
stitutional principles outside of political sphere, because these principles are con-
sidered as constraints and preconditions for a just political system. Legal 
constitutionalists employ two strategies for depoliticizing principles: the first 
consists in establishing constraints and boundaries to political sphere, con-
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sidering certain values as beyond politics. The second tries to make an apolitical 
form of politics in which particular issues are discussed (Bellamy 2007). 
The first strategy takes different forms for depoliticizing politics: on one hand, 
Bellamy argues, it is associated with a liberal tradition expressed – for example – 
by Locke. According to this view, political power exists to protect and ensure 
certain pre-political rights. As Bellamy writes: 
 
“Politics is limited by such rights in two senses. On the one hand, political bodies 
and their agents ought not to interfere with individuals in ways that might infringe 
these rights; on the other hand, they have an obligation to positively promote them. 
After all, even ‘negative’ liberty rights, such as the freedom not to be physically 
assaulted by others, require positive state action in the form of a police force and a 
regular system of criminal justice in order to be secured” (Bellamy 2007, 147). 
 
The second strategy for depoliticizing politics takes an apolitical form of politics 
to overcome disagreements. Such apolitical strategy appeals to particular modes 
of public debate to remove the sources of partiality and self-interest, leading to a 
convergence on public interest (Bellamy 2007). In this case, “if all persons are 
obliged to argue on a basis of equality with others, so that they can only pursue 
their own good in ways that show equal concern and respect for the good of 
everyone else, then it should be possible to arrive at a reasonable consensus on 
the rules that are to govern their existence and, on some accounts, even collective 
policies too” (Bellamy 2007, 150). 
According to Bellamy, in Rawls the Constitution is conceived both “to prevent 
democracy from interfering with the private and personal beliefs and activities of 
individuals” and to defend democracy against these interests, removing the 
discussion about rights and liberties – and about divisive questions – from the 
political agenda. 
 
“In Lecture VI of Political Liberalism, Rawls attempts to avoid some of the 
difficulties of a purely ‘ideal’ politics by adopting a ‘dualist’ understanding of the re-
lationship between democracy and the constitution. According to this thesis, 
constitutional constraints on ‘normal’ politics result from democratic ‘consti-
tutional’ politics, most notably at the conventions that bring political regimes into 
being. He now maintains that the ideal politics of public reason need only operate 
on these latter sorts of occasions or when they are replicated at times of judicial 
review by constitutional courts. Since the resulting constraints are themselves the 
product of popular endorsement, they involve no curtailment of the will of the 
people. Instead, they represent forms of democratic pre-commitment or self-
restraint not to overturn the basis of democratic politics itself. As such, they are 
analogous to personal forms of pre-commitment… and like them are presented as 
an example of self-governance and autonomy, rather than as an abridgement of our 
collective freedom” (Bellamy 1996, 86). 
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Bellamy's critique of legal constitutionalism – specially in Rawlsian theory – 
focuses on the idea that if we cannot distinguish between “constitutional” and 
“normal” politics, at the same time we cannot portray constitutional judges as 
“the guardians of the people's own best selves” (Bellamy 1996; Rawls 1993). 
In A Matter of Principle, Dworkin asks two important questions about the role 
of the judges. The first “practical” question is about how judges could decide hard 
cases: “Do judges in USA or UK make political decisions? Should their decisions be 
political?” (Dworkin 1985). Dworkin admits that judges make political decisions 
in one way: in many cases their decisions will be approved by one political group 
and disliked by others, because these decisions can animate moral, ethical or 
political disputes and controversies, and because – often – these decisions 
concern political or legislative acts enacted by the parliament.  
 
“I want to ask whether judges should decide cases on political grounds, so that the 
decision is not only the decision that certain political groups would wish, but is 
taken on the ground that certain principles on political morality are right. A judge 
who decides on political grounds is not deciding on grounds of party politics. He 
does not decide in favour of the interpretation sought by the unions because he is 
(or was) a member of the Labour party, for example. But the political principles in 
which he believes, like, for example, the belief that equality is an important political 
aim, may be more characteristic of some political parties than others” (Dworkin 
1985, 9). 
 
The second question about the role of judges is not a “practical” question, but 
rather theoretical: what is the rule of law? The answer is based on the distinction 
between two different conceptions of the rule of law: Dworkin calls the first “rule-
book” conception (Dworkin 1985); it concerns the idea that the power of the 
state should never be exercised against individual citizens, except according with 
the rules set out in this common “rule book”. The other conception is the so-called 
“rights” conception, which assumes that citizens have moral rights and reciprocal 
duties and political rights against the state. According to this conception, moral 
and political rights have to be recognized and enforced by positive law and 
through courts and judiciary. As Dworkin argues, “it does not distinguish, as the 
rule-book conception does, between the rule of law and substantive justice. On 
the contrary, it requires, as part of the ideal of law, that the rules in the rule-book 
capture and enforce moral rights” (Dworkin 1985, 12). 
Dworkin defends the fact that judges are not elected or re-elected, because the 
decisions they make are decisions that concerns particular cases and they should 
be immune from popular control. However, Dworkin notes, it follows that the 
judges should not make independent decisions about the “rule book” (changing 
or expanding it) because these decisions should be made only under popular 
control. In UK, instead, when Parliament – elected by people – is not satisfied with 
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a particular decision made by judges, it can override that decision by making a 
new appropriate legislation (Dworkin 1985). Despite this, Dworkin underlines 
that legislative power is limited. 
 
“Legislative time is a scarce resource, to be allocated with some sense of political 
priorities and it may well be that a judicial decision would be overruled if parlia-
ment had time to pass every law it would like to pass, but will not be overruled 
because Parliament does not. In some cases there is a further difficulty in this 
answer. When an issue is the subject of great controversy, then Parliament may be 
disabled from changing a judicial decision, for practical political reasons, because 
any change would infuriate some powerful section of the community or alienate 
some parts of a governing coalition” (Dworkin 1985, 18). 
 
Following Dworkin, we can distinguish between two conceptions of democracy. 
The first is a “majoritarian” conception, in which democracy is based on the idea 
that all matters of principle should be decided by a majority vote. According to 
this idea of democracy, an institution like judicial review of legislation, which 
gives judges the power to overturn acts or decisions approved by a parliamentary 
majority, is clearly undemocratic (Dworkin 2006).  
On the contrary, democracy could be understood as “self-government” of all 
the people who recognize themselves as free and equal members of the society. 
Dworkin defends this conception as more democratic than the majoritarian one; 
on one hand, Dworkin notes that we cannot have real democracy as self-
government if citizens don't have the opportunity to play an equal part in politi-
cal life and it includes equal voting right, equal freedom of expression in public 
deliberations and so on. On the other hand, we cannot have democracy if people 
as individuals don't have an equal participation in government (Dworkin 2006). 
 
“According to the alternative view of democracy – you might call it partnership 
democracy – majority rule isn't even legitimate, let alone democratic, unless these 
conditions are at least substantially met. So if you adopt that partnership view of 
democracy the argument that judicial review is in its nature inconsistent with 
democracy fails. I do not mean that constitutional democracy positively demands a 
structure like ours, a structure that records the democratic conditions in a written, 
foundational document and assigns final interpretative authority to courts over 
whether those conditions have been met. You might well think that it would have 
been better to have given that responsibility to some special elected body, that the 
decision we either made or ratified in the nineteenth century to give unelected 
judges that interpretative responsibility was unwise… You can't say that the 
majority has an automatic, default, title to make those interpretative decisions 
without begging the question, because of course the majority has no title to govern 
unless the conditions are satisfied. It begs the question to think that the concept of 
democracy can dictate which institutions should or should not be given final inter-
pretative authority” (Dworkin 2006, 134). 
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Frank Michelman asks two questions about constitutionalism and democracy: 
the first asks how is it theoretically possible to reconcile the ideas of self-de-
termination and popular sovereignty – which are related to democracy – with the 
limits imposed to the power (related to constitutionalism)? The second question 
asks how it can be legitimated – and what should be – the role of the constitu-
tional or supreme courts inside these systems? 
Michelman answers the first question through what he calls “the paradox of 
constitutional democracy”, that is the difficult reconciliation between two oppo-
sed principles such as sovereignty and limitation of the power. As some scholars 
note, Michelman identifies two “conflicting principles” at the base of institutional 
systems: “on one hand, the ideal of government subject to law (as constitu-
tionalism) and – on the other hand – the ideal of government through popular 
will (as democracy)” (Michelman 1999). These principles are opposed because 
each of them requires different considerations: on one hand, democratic principle 
requires that the choices about fundamental laws fall within the sphere of 
democratic decision-making; on the other hand, the principle of constitutiona-
lism requires that at least some of fundamental laws and rights are left out of 
democratic political decisions (Michelman 1999). 
In Michelman's view, the problem of undemocratic nature of unelected 
constitutional judges would be resolved if citizens could directly interpret the 
constitution.  
 
“A simple way to do it is to abolish judicial review. If Congress or a state legislature 
stands charged with enacting laws that the laws of lawmaking prohibit, or with 
failing to enact laws that the laws of lawmaking command, let the voters decide the 
charges at the next elections. They can find out how candidates stand on the matter 
and elect those who will carry out the people’s judgment, repealing the offending 
law or enacting the missing one. Congress then is not the judge of its own cause, or 
a fox set to guard the people’s chickens. Congress may have a cause, but the people 
are the judge; Congress may be a fox, but the people are the guard. To make the 
Court the judge and the guard is, from the standpoint of democracy, to put the 
Court in the people’s rightful place. So it might be and has been contended” 
(Michelman 1999, 21–22). 
 
 
Political Constitutionalism and the “circumstances of politics” 
 
Richard Bellamy – reworking Jeremy Waldron's thesis – gives us the definition of 
“circumstances of politics” when he says that “circumstances of politics are 
circumstances where we disagree about both the right and the good, yet 
nonetheless require a collective decision on these matters. Consequently, the con-
stitution cannot be treated as a basic law or norm” (Bellamy 2007, 5). On one 
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hand, according to this view, constitution cannot be considered a fundamental 
norm, but a question which can be subject of political debate; on the other hand, 
constitution is identified with political rather than legal system, especially with 
the ways political power is organized and managed.  
 
“Legal constitutionalists acknowledge that no constitution will survive long unless 
citizens can identify with it. Joseph Raz remarks how a constitution must serve ‘not 
only as the lawyers’ law, but as the people’s law’, its main provisions commanding 
general consent as the ‘common ideology’ that governs public life” (Bellamy 2007, 
6). 
 
Other fundamental issue for political constitutionalism is the principle of 
majority rule, and – as Goldoni writes – it respects equality among citizens in two 
ways: “on one hand, it recognizes to each opinion an equal importance and the 
equal opportunity to contribute to the final result of the decision; on the other 
hand, majority rule devotes equal consideration to the differences, because the 
decision that it allows to adopt is not influenced by possible results to which the 
procedure leads us” (Goldoni 2011, 346). 
As Marco Goldoni reminds us, in Rawlsian political theory, reasonable dis-
agreement concerns only conceptions of good, but we can reach an overlapping 
consensus on constitutional essentials and on the conception of justice. Fun-
damental rights and liberties must be out of ordinary political discussion and the 
interpretation about principles and fundamental rules is related to the public 
reason and to Supreme Court, which is its exemplar (Goldoni 2011; Rawls 1993). 
 
“For political constitutionalists, public reason takes plurally procedural character-
ristics and mainly electoral. In a plural and democratic society, it identifies itself – 
on institutional level – with parliament and – on procedural level – with electoral 
moments. Benefits offered by centrality of parliament are twofold. The first is 
probably the most important: parliaments protect rights better than court. Natu-
rally, courts are responsible for respect of individual rights. But the core of political 
constitutionalists's argument disputes to courts the ability to deliberate better than 
parliaments – on these themes – and with more attention for disadvantaged 
people” (Goldoni 2011, 349). 
 
Another important aspect is that – for political constitutionalists – parliament 
has political accountability in front of citizens. It means that government is 
responsible in front of parliament, which is expression of popular will. Instead, 
the court – especially the Supreme Court – has no political responsibility. As 
Goldoni observes, this is not a problem for political constitutionalists when the 
activity of the courts is focused on interpretation of the laws or on legal disputes. 
Instead, the problem arises when courts discuss about political issues (like, for 
example about the principles of a just democratic society). Finally, courts are not 
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under popular control because judges are not elected by people (Goldoni 2011). 
We can argue that “political constitutionalism defends the idea that the only 
constitution, able to protect rights, enforce the rule of law and the political 
system, should be found in democratic process itself. So, according to this posi-
tion, constitution is a political process, not a norm. This process, based on princi-
ple of political equality, is both constituent and constituted, according a monist 
conception of democracy” (Goldoni 2011, 352). 
Legal constitutionalism also defends the so called structural entrenchment. For 
legal interpretation, individual rights precede politics and political process and 
they are “entrenched” in a constitution or in a bill of rights. Some scholars – like 
Michelman, for example – propose the conception of unenumerated rights, the 
idea that there are some important rights outside the disponibility of legislative 
majorities so that they cannot change or overturn the democratic system 
(Michelman; Ferrajoli; Ferrara). According to this interpretation “...people can 
enter the political process insofar they are endowed with certain rights which lie 
outside the realm of politics. As these rights are recognized as being evident on 
the basis of reason or as natural rights, their content should not be left to the 
bargaining that typically characterizes political decision-making” (Goldoni 2012, 
931). These rights are protected from political and parliamentary debate in the 
sense that temporary parliamentary majorities cannot call them into question.  
Rights are not left under the exclusive protection of legislation and parliamen-
tary activity, because legislation is “more prone to be guided by utilitarian consi-
derations in decision-making process” (Goldoni 2012). If, for political constitu-
tionalists, rights are not based on an individualistic ground, but on the principle 
of common good, for legal constitutionalists instead, rights are based on indi-
vidual interests and they defend them from government. So, as regards political 
representation and democratic sovereignty, according to political constitutio-
nalists, the best way to ensure the common good and to respect the popular will 
is to develop a system of equal votes, majority rule and political competition 
between the parties. According to this discussion, the best way to achieve a 
political and institutional equilibrium to guarantee the principle of political 
equality is the so-called neo-parlamentarism (Goldoni 2012; Waldron 1999). As 
Marco Goldoni notes: 
 
“Parliament is seen by political constitutionalists as the only institution which can 
express the plurality of opinions and respect disagreements while at the same time 
reaching an authoritative decision. Waldron has elegantly summed up the author-
itative character of the activity of the parliament in the following terms: ‘the au-
thority of a law is its emergence, under specified procedures, as a ‘unum’ out of a 
plurality of ideas, concerns, and proposals, in circumstances where we recognize a 
need for one decision made together, not many decisions made by each of us 
alone’” (Goldoni 2012, 935). 
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For legal constitutionalists, there are pre-political features that limit public 
reasoning; for example, fundamental rights should be considered as pre-political 
for their nature and because they represent a limit on majority rule. When certain 
issues are in discussion, we can achieve a sort of general consensus after a proper 
deliberation and debate (Goldoni 2012). 
 
“Public reason, according to Rawls, is limited to ‘constitutional essentials’ and 
matters of basic justice. The conceptual setting for Rawls’s construction of public 
reason is the original position. Through this device, citizens endowed with dual 
moral power (a sense of justice and a conception of the good) and deprived of the 
knowledge of their own social and economic status, choose two principles of justice 
on which two rational agents can apparently reach an agreement. It is easier and 
more probable that individuals placed in the original position will find ‘a shared 
point of view’ in the principles of justice and, since constitutional essentials have to 
be designed ‘to choose the most effective just constitution’. The same principles 
will constitute guiding output reasons. For Rawls, in a well-ordered polity, citizens 
legitimately expect their representatives to act and decide according to the idea of 
public reason. Although Rawls concedes that the Supreme Court is not the only 
possible seat of public reason, traces of his legalistic understanding of public 
reason are disseminated throughout his texts. The test Rawls proposes to adopt as 
a way of checking whether a citizen is acting according to the idea of public reason 
is quite telling: we should ask ‘how would our argument strike us presented in the 
form of a Supreme Court opinion?’” (Goldoni 2012, 937–938). 
  
For political constitutionalists instead, Rawlsian public reason underestimates 
disagreement because “it already filters some of its more unsettling expressions 
through an idealized procedure” (Goldoni 2012); as Rawls points out, the idea of 
rights and fair constitution is supported and defended by the most reasonable 
political conception of justice, and not by the result of an ordinary political 
process (Rawls 1993). So, Bellamy's and Waldron's critiques to Rawlsian 
constitutionalism are focused on the fact that Rawlsian idea of public reason 
implies the total absence of any reference to political process. In his critique, 
Bellamy argues that Rawls “depoliticizes” public reason and excludes consti-
tutional essentials from any kind of debate, dispute or contestation. So, “Rawls’s 
public reason is the practice of a reason where conflict is reduced as primarily 
involving doctrines and overcome by resorting to a device that enables the 
emergence of consensus” (Goldoni 2012). 
Especially in Rawls, the constitutional system is characterized by the idea of 
effectively depoliticizing fundamental political rights and liberties, not only ta-
king these rights outside the political agenda, but removing from the agenda the 
most divisive issues and all those values and principles “that might lead us to 
interpret the political values in conflicting ways” (Bellamy 2007). Bellamy criti-
cizes Rawlsian position arguing that this insulation is impossible and undesir-
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able, because it risks excluding important issues from free and democratic dis-
cussion. 
 
“The result, he (Rawls) claims, will be a stable political settlement based on mutual 
tolerance. By contrast, I shall argue this proposed insulation of the political sphere 
from people’s prime concerns is not only impossible but also undesirable. It pre-
vents politics from performing its crucial function of reconciling differences 
through negotiation and debate. It also risks excluding important minority issues 
from the political agenda and thereby delegitimizing the public sphere – the very 
problem Rawls seeks to avoid. Moreover, it assumes what it purports to show – 
namely, that a functioning democracy requires that citizens adopt a certain view of 
democratic values” (Bellamy 2007, 102). 
 
Bellamy argues that democracy can allow government to possess a legislative 
majority to make important political decisions, especially when this majority 
have won the support of a large electoral plurality in free and fair elections. So 
that, the electoral process amount to a model of public reasoning in which 
“citizens are shown equal concern and respect as rights holders when deciding on 
their collective arrangements” (Bellamy 2007). 
Bellamy highlights that, in some situations, the claim of governments to be the 
voice of the people which express a legislative majority are far weaker, so – 
consequently – the need and the legitimacy of an independent institution which 
works as a check of their power becomes stronger. According to Bellamy's 
interpretation, there are three arguments that we should follow: 
 
“The first is when executives have to respond to an exceptional crisis that was un-
anticipated in any party manifesto and where, as in threats to national security, 
there is an especial risk that civil liberties may be overlooked as a result of preci-
pitate action to meet an emergency. The second is when legislating on matters of 
private morality that nonetheless have a public dimension: issues such as abortion 
and gay marriage fit this category, for example. Finally, there are laws and policies 
involving ‘discrete and insular minorities’, who may be unable to build electoral 
coalitions with other groups and hence have no electoral clout whereby their inte-
rests might be protected” (Bellamy 2007, 249). 
 
Each of these three arguments is pivotal in constitutional and democratic 
debate. First of all – as regards the first, about exceptional crisis – sometimes it's 
necessary to make emergency legislation to fight threats such as terrorism. An 
example is the USA Patriot Act, enacted by President George W. Bush after 9/11 
attacks against Twin Towers. As Bellamy underlines, the terroristic threats and 
the fear of governments to be blamed for failing to adequately protect citizens 
against terrorism are good reasons for sacrificing liberty to have more “security”. 
So in these cases it is necessary to have a big majority to enact this legislation, but 
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in some cases courts may rejects these acts because they may be unconstitutional 
or undemocratic. In this case, courts would be counter-majoritarian. 
Jeremy Waldron has remarked that moral questions, for example, have pro-
duced a strong but free and democratic discussion about abortion, As Bellamy 
notes, “(Waldron) attributes the degree of mutual recognition between pro-
choice and prolife movement, who were to be found within all parties, to the fact 
that neither side was being forced to concede they were wrong in their inter-
pretation of matters of fundamental political principle” (Bellamy 2007, 253). In 
this sense, political process requires recognizing that there are two or more sides 
of the question at stake and that they deserve to be treated with equality and 
respect. According to Bellamy, free votes may be extended to different issues (so, 
also to moral and ethical issues). 
 
“Some republican theorists have argued that free votes ought to be extended to 
more issues and become the norm for legislative debates on matters of principle. 
However, the key to the legitimacy of parliament lies in its being both rep-
resentative and accountable. Parties, as we saw, play a vital role in this regard 
because they make it possible for views on a range of policies to be brought 
together in ways that render legislators delegates of the electorate. On the rare 
occasions legislation relating to personal morality is necessary, then free votes 
seem appropriate because these issues cut across the dominant party divisions. In 
this case, the legislature is acting as a rough microcosm of the nation as a whole. 
But that is not the normal basis on which parliament operates. On most issues of 
public policy, the agenda has been set at the general election and parliament’s role 
is to reflect voting in that popular arena” (Bellamy 2007, 254–255). 
 
Finally, the third argument (about “insular minorities”) concerns the fact that, 
in case of small and concentrated ethnical minorities, it would be possible to 
devolve special powers to these regions. The problem, Bellamy argues, rises in 
case of territorially dispersed or isolated groups, that risk to be politically and 
electorally insignificant and risk not having their interests considered fairly at all. 
To avoid these risks, “significant minorities can often be important political allies 
in the formation of coalitions, giving them political influence well beyond their 
voting strength” (Bellamy 2007). It means that the existence of different cultural 
or ethnic, or religious minorities – with their needs – is not politically isolated. It 
is always possible to devote political attention to these minorities, even if – in 
some case – they seem to be isolated. Bellamy defends the idea of “circumstances 
of politics” as a tool to enforce democratic system. 
 
Within the circumstances of politics, the commitment to equality of concern and 
respect that animates most contemporary theories of rights and the rule of law can 
only be met via a form of self-rule that satisfies the condition of non-domination. A 
system of equal votes and majority rule complies with this criterion by offering a 
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procedural form of public reasoning that provides a fair means for ‘hearing the 
other side’. Competition between political parties further reinforces this system by 
promoting the responsiveness of political agents to their citizen principals and of 
citizens to each other (Bellamy 2007, 259). 
 
For Bellamy, judicial review weakens constitutionality of democracy, because it 
puts a non-political and unrepresentative institution above legislative and demo-
cratic institutions. Bellamy's idea is that it doesn't mean the existing democracies 
are perfect and judicial review is necessarily imperfect. According to Bellamy, “the 
democratic arrangements found in the world’s established working democracies 
are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of republican non-domination, whereas 
all efforts to improve on such arrangements through judicial intervention create 
conditions of domination. Judicial review undermines the equality of concern and 
respect between citizens that lies at the heart of the constitutional project and 
that democratic processes serve to secure” (Bellamy 2007, 260). In another 
passage, Bellamy insists that “the counter-majoritarian and dominating character 
of judicial review, along with the parallel drawbacks of most forms of became-
ralism and many neo-federal arrangements, erode yet further the equality of 
votes and the incentives towards responsibility and accountability of politicians” 
(Bellamy 2007). 
Bellamy also discusses three possible “qualities” of the courts, especially with 
regard to their democratic character. The first concerns the idea that the courts 
are not counter-democratic but they uphold democratic constitutional ideals and 
they can be considered as an exemplary of a true democratic process. In this first 
argument, Bellamy refers to Rawls and to his idea that US Supreme Court is the 
“exemplar of public reason” (Bellamy 2013; Rawls 1993); in referring to Rawls, 
Bellamy argues that Courts could be democratic in three ways: 
 
“First, it upholds the principles that are intrinsic to the democratic public sphere. It 
may override certain decisions of that democratic process but only to preserve 
democracy. Second, the Court deliberates in an ideally democratic way because it is 
constrained when it comes to deciding issues that raise ‘constitutional essentials’ to 
only employ public reasons – reasons that simply reflect the values of a democratic 
society and process – when reaching its judgment. Thirdly, the Court has a demo-
cratic mandate from the people, as the authorisers of the constitution and the ulti-
mate arbiters of how it should be interpreted” (Bellamy 2013, 338). 
 
Following Bruce Ackerman's dualist theory of democracy, Rawls distinguishes 
“normal” politics from “constitutional” politics. Normal politics is made by par-
liament and it is democratically legitimated by a political and electoral process, 
which involves majority rule; at the same time, this “political” stage is subject to a 
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higher law (the constitution) that is legitimated and protected by a super-
majoritarian and undemocratic court (Bellamy 2013). 
Political constitutionalists like Jeremy Waldron and Richard Bellamy criticizes 
this argument, arguing that it confuses popular sovereignty with democracy 
(Waldron 1999; Bellamy 2013). This means that We, the People may be sovereign, 
but it does not mean that the institution they choose would be ipso facto demo-
cratic, because they could use their sovereign power to establish a non-demo-
cratic regime. Democratic legitimacy implies that the political system be really 
democratic, not only in its establishment.  
The second quality of the courts refers to the idea of “participatory democ-
racy”. This argument follows Philip Pettit's distinction between “authorial” and 
“editorial” – or “contestatory” – democracy. Authorial democracy involves citi-
zens in collective policies, within electoral systems. As Bellamy highlights, “the 
claim to democratic legitimacy stems from the electoral process being a public 
mechanism that allows citizens to advance their interests on an equal basis to 
each other” and the, later, Bellamy adds that “within the context of a given case a 
Court will hear from all affected parties. In this way, the legal forum comes to 
reflect the wider political forum” (Bellamy 2013, 345). This implies that legal 
forum can reflect political forum, although legal reasons for blocking or support-
ing certain issues are different from political or electoral reasons; in legal case, 
for example, it will be specific impact of a specific issue discussed by court. 
 
“Above all, the final determination of a case lies not with the litigators but the 
judiciary. It is their vote alone that counts in Court – indeed, nobody else has a right 
to vote. Even if the campaigns and hearings themselves were as free and equal as 
the electoral process, a crucial element is missing – it is not the parties to this 
process who determine the outcome. Litigation offers the right to petition for rights 
but is not itself a right to define and determine the rights of the collectivity. Thus, 
the credentials of litigation as a mode of ‘authorial’ democracy are weak” (Bellamy 
2013, 346). 
 
On the other hand, judges can only decide a case focusing on legislation or on 
constitution that has itself been democratically endorsed. “These constrains”, 
Bellamy writes, “move litigation towards the model of ‘editorial’ democracy’” 
(Bellamy 2013). This case for democratic legitimacy can be related to something 
like Rawlsian idea of public reason and “it assumes that the editorial rules 
provided by constitution reflect a democratic consensus as to the norms of a 
democratic society and that they can be applied in an impartial way that reflects 
this consensus by the Court” (Bellamy 2013).  
 
“Editorial democracy presumes to offer public criteria that can distinguish groups 
that are heard within the democratic process but fail to convince from those who 
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either fail to get a hearing at all or whose very right to be treated as worthy of a 
hearing is being denied. As a result, those who litigate in this spirit argue that 
either the process was deficient or that the decision itself denies them their 
democratic rights. Yet, we saw how these matters prove impossible to determine 
without the judiciary taking a position on the very disagreements about political 
justice that may have been at issue in the legislative process. Thus, an intense 
minority, who feel very strongly in favour of a policy that the rest of the population 
feel moderately opposed to, may argue the electoral process has let them down by 
not appropriately weighting the intensity of their views. However, even if this case 
is treated as a ‘mere’ procedural issue it raises contentious and burdensome 
judgements over process rights” (Bellamy 2013, 347). 
 
The third argument concerns the idea of the “courts as representative democ-
racy” and it is essentially related to the idea of “representation”; it consists of a 
negative and positive thesis. According to the negative thesis, the democratic 
critique of the courts fails because, in representative democracies, the legislation 
cannot be regarded as something that reflects popular will. In this sense, leg-
islation is the result of deliberation of representatives in parliament or leg-
islature; but at the same time, representatives are not delegates or constituent, 
but they can be considered as trustees (Bellamy 2013).  
 
“As such, a democratic case against judicial review based on the equal right of 
citizens to participate in legislation proves as telling against the legislature as it 
does against constitutional Courts. For legislators likewise possess a superior 
voting weight to ordinary citizens and exercise their independent moral judgment 
when making decisions concerning the whole of the political community, often 
going against the express wishes of the citizens who voted for them” (Bellamy 
2013, 349). 
 
This argument is focused on a negative thesis, because the distinction between 
delegate and trustee fails to take into account the full range of representative 
roles that politicians play in their office. In his article, Bellamy quotes Jan 
Mansbridge's distinction between “promissory”, “anticipatory” and “gyroscopic” 
conception of representation (Bellamy 2013; Mansbridge 2003). The first con-
ception mainly corresponds to the delegatory model, in which representatives 
are delegates by electoral body and they has to keep fidelity to their electoral 
promises. So, “representatives belong to parties and are subject to party disci-
pline, and the findings of the manifesto research group suggest that once elected 
parties do keep faith to their electoral promises to a remarkable degree promises 
are often vague policy goals, so representatives may still act as trustees and 
deliberate over the appropriate means to meet these promised ends” (Bellamy 
2007). According to anticipatory conception, representatives could be sensitive 
to new attitudes or needs among the electorate that follow new political 
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circumstances or respond to the success or failure of previous policies. In this 
sense, representatives are able to anticipate what the voters think and what the 
voter will approve in the next election (Bellamy 2013). Finally, representatives 
may have to face unanticipated decisions. As Bellamy argues:  
 
“… In doing so voters may be able to expect they will decide in expected ways 
without external incentives because they have been selected on the basis of their 
prior beliefs and convictions. Here, representatives fit into the third category and 
act as gyroscopes, rotating around a set of relatively stable convictions. Even so, 
although their authority derives for the most part from the process of autho-
risation, they are liable to be held accountable should they act other than expected” 
(Bellamy 2013, 350). 
 
This means that representatives follows and are sensitive to popular will and 
voter preferences and they are in dialogue with them, differently from judiciary. 
Judges can be categorised in gyroscopic and anticipatory argument: gyroscopic 
argument concerns with the selection of judges, which is directly subject to 
political control, but – Bellamy argues – even where there's greater independence 
from political power, courts hope that their decisions gained consensus by the 
government and the electorate. But, otherwise, “they risk both a loss of legitimacy 
and an implementation deficit, given there are many ways a judgment can be 
blocked or undermined through half-hearted, underfunded or delayed com-
pliance. As a result, they practice a weak form of anticipatory representation, so 
that – as Robert Dahl highlights – ‘Courts follow the polls’ to the extent of 
reflecting sustained, national popular opinion” (Bellamy 2013, 350). In the last 
part of his article, Bellamy highlights that: 
 
“Legislators are only trustees to a limited degree. To the extent judges are, then the 
degree they can be trusted to uphold democratic values does not rest on the norms 
embedded in the Constitution or its periodic endorsement by referenda – argu-
ments akin to those of Rawls criticised earlier. Rather, their representativeness 
stems from a variety of indirect democratic pressures. Once again, the democratic 
legitimacy of the Court arises from its being within an electoral political system 
rather than independent from it” (Bellamy 2013, 350). 
 
Jeremy Waldron makes a distinction between democracy and popular sove-
reignty, in which the principle of popular sovereignty requires that people should 
have whatever constitution, whatever form of government they want (Waldron 
1999), but popular sovereignty does not remove or ignore existing differences 
among the various forms of government from which people have the possibility 
to choose. In this sense, he refers to John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, underlining 
that they argue that the people had the right to vest legislative power in a single 
individual, in a small group of individuals or in an assembly. For Hobbes, the 
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sovereign power could not be vested in a democratic assembly, instead Locke 
believed in collective body as vested of this power. As Waldron stresses, “... the 
distinction between a democratic method of constitutional choice and the 
democratic character of the constitution that is chosen is clearest when we can 
point to a founding moment in the life of a political society (a moment of consti-
tutional choice) and distinguish between the decision-procedures used at the 
moment and the decisions-procedures which it was decided to employ in all 
subsequent political decision-making” (Waldron 1999, 256). 
 
 
Defending the “rule of judges” 
 
In this last part of my article, I try to clarify the theoretical framework of discus-
sion, identifying three different lines of reasoning, that represent three main 
ways of interpreting the counter-majoritarian difficulty and the question of the 
so-called “rule of judges” in democracy. The first retraces the legal conception of 
constitutionalism, defending the idea of judicial review and its democratic legiti-
macy in front of the people (Rawls 1993; Dworkin 1985); the second retraces the 
political critique to legal version and highlights the position of some important 
authors that reject the institution of judicial review, defending – on their part – 
the role of the parliament in constitutional decision-making. 
For Rawlsian liberal constitutionalism, in a constitutional regime characteri-
zed by a strong judicial review, public reason is considered as the reason of 
Supreme Court. Rawlsian legal constitutionalism is also based on a dualist con-
ception of democracy and it defends a distinction between “supreme” law and 
“ordinary” law. “Supreme” law is expressed by constituent power and it takes its 
authority by the people. As Rawls underlines, constitutional power cannot be left 
to the legislative branch. In Rawlsian conception, Supreme Court protects consti-
tutional essential included in a bill of rights from the legislation of a temporary 
parliamentary majority or from the interests of a particular political group.  
Rawls defends his idea of democratic constitutionalism, highlighting that “if 
the Court assumes this role and it plays it well, it's wrong to call it sic and 
simpliciter undemocratic; but it is counter-majoritarian respect to the ordinary 
law, because, with the power of judicial review, the Court can declare it unconsti-
tutional. The Court is not counter-majoritarian respect to the supreme law, 
provided that the decision it makes is reasonable in agreement with the consti-
tution, with its amendments and with its interpretations in political mandate” 
(Rawls 1993, 212). 
The role of the Supreme Court in Rawlsian theory is strictly related to the idea 
of public reason; citizens and legislators, Rawls argues, can vote accordingly with 
their moral convictions or with their comprehensive views when constitutional 
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essentials or matters of fundamental justice are not at stake. When Rawls says 
that the Court is the exemplar of public reason, he means that the judges cannot 
refers to their moral values or to their comprehensive doctrines but they must 
only refer to the constitution and its precedents.  
According to Rawls, an amendment is not only a change; it could be necessary 
to adapt fundamental constitutional values to new political and social conditions 
or to introduce in constitution a new conception of these values, more inclusive 
and wider. An amendment could also be necessary to improve the institutions to 
remove the weaknesses that emerge during the decades.  
In political critique of constitutionalism, instead, we can find that important 
political constitutionalists like Bellamy, Waldron and Tushnet, move their main 
criticism to legal constitutional view arguing that the counter-majoritarian diffi-
culty is a real problem for democracy, In fact they believe that the so-called “rule 
of judges” can represent an undemocratic way to solve matters concerning 
constitutional essentials. In this sense, unelected judges have no popular autho-
rity to reject a constitutional amendment or to consider as unconstitutional a le-
gislative act. This critique is obviously based on monist model of democracy in 
which there is no supreme or constitutional court and in which the protection of 
constitutional liberties and rights is in the hands of parliament and of legislative 
majorities, which are expression of popular will and sovereignty. It means that in 
this position there's also a strong rejection of any form of judicial review of 
legislation and I consider Mark Tushnet as one of the strongest critics of this 
institution. 
In his most relevant work, Tushnet notes that the question of the scope of 
judicial review is based on some ideas: on one hand, differently from decisions by 
unelected judges, decisions by elected legislators have fully democratic legitimacy 
and justification, and, on the other hand, it implies that legislators have a broader 
authority to make judgments (Tushent 1999). Tushnet replies to legal consti-
tutionalists' opinions arguing that: 
 
“Some defences of judicial review rely on formalist doctrines so that courts can 
control officials who, the judges believe, are less capable than the judges them-
selves. That approach makes sense to the judges, but it should not make sense to 
the officials. A legislator should be able to say, ‘Who are they to tell me that I’m no 
good at my job?’ Where the court’s constitutional interpretation is shaped by a 
formalist judgment that legislators are not as good as judges at determining what 
the Constitution means, a legislator would only reinforce that judgment by thinking 
that the Constitution itself required the doctrines the judges develop” (Tushnet 
1999, 61). 
 
 
The Debate on Constitutional Courts and Their Authority  
between Legal and Political Constitutionalism 
 
 
 
67 
Another critique concerns the fact that, although legal constitutionalists defend 
judges independence from politics, judicial review in United States is connected 
to ordinary politics, anyway. So as Tushnet writes, judges are nominated by the 
president and confirmed by the Senate and they are not chosen by legal experts 
according to their legal experiences. In that sense, the nomination and con-
firmation of the judges are deeply political process; it reflects the political direc-
tion in the Congress and the political side in the Presidency. So, Tushnet asks, 
where is this “independence”? 
 
“At times presidents will rely on the judgments of respected lawyers about who the 
best nominee is, and at times presidents will calculate how nominating one person 
will appeal to political interest groups. In both cases the president is concerned 
about how the nomination will affect his or her political standing with important 
constituencies. At times senators will defer to a president’s choices and at times 
they will vigorously interrogate the nominee. In both cases the senators are 
concerned about how their behaviour will play with their constituents. At times 
interest groups will mobilize their constituents around a nomination, and at times 
they will not. Nomination politics are politics, after all.” (Tushnet 1999, 152). 
 
 
Conclusion. How to respond to these arguments 
 
In conclusion of my paper I want to try to propose a third argument about 
representation in constitutional theory. As we have seen, the problem concerning 
counter-majoritarian difficulty is a real question that deserves much attention 
and it still animates a large debate within liberal democratic constitutionalism.  
Now, the questions I tried to answer in this paper are three: 1. What do we 
mean with counter-majoritarian difficulty? 2. What are the answers the two 
models of constitutionalism give to this question? 3. Can we propose a third 
answer that includes the other two? 
I tried to answer to the first two questions in the first part of the article, but in 
this last part I want to try to propose an answer to the third question, in which we 
can highlight new elements of discussion.  
If we follow legal constitutionalism, we have to move from Rawlsian concept-
tion of public reason and from the related conception of Supreme Court as its 
perfect exemplar (Rawls 1993). At the same time, we should consider the fact 
that there are constitutional principles that should be kept outside the political 
discussion and, consequently, outside the availability of temporary political ma-
jorities. In this sense, according to Michelman's idea of unenumerated rights, we 
cannot put fundamental rights under ordinary political activity and assume that 
they are subject to what Luigi Ferrajoli and especially Alessandro Ferrara call 
structural entrenchment.  
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Secondly we consider that constitutional judges do not represent an active 
“political” power and they do not draw their authority from popular vote, but 
from constitution itself. As Dworkin notes, we cannot consider judges as trustees 
or representatives of a political party, but we should regard them as guardians of 
the Constitution and of the principles ensured in it. So it means that when consti-
tutional essentials are at stake, we cannot consider judges as undemocratic, 
because in these cases the basic principles of the democracy itself are at stake and 
only judges – independent from politics – can guarantee them. 
Our society has to face a new social, cultural and political condition – some-
thing that Alessandro Ferrara has designed as hyperpluralism.1 – in which we face 
a new “kind” of society. In this new view of our society, we should have a much 
broader idea of pluralism: for example, we have to consider that we don't have 
now only the three “classic” and monotheist religions (Catholic, Jewish, Muslims) 
but we also have to face new religious movements and faiths; at the same time, 
questions of new rights arise: gay marriage, abortion etc. Constitutionalism has to 
face these and new other challenges. 
So, Courts are maybe better situated and equipped to recognize and enshrine 
these new conditions of pluralism; probably the discussion about some new 
rights cannot be left in the hands of the parliament because probably parliament 
is too constrained be political reason for which a political groups could boycott 
the acknowledgement of such rights for moral or ethical reasons. Let's take, for 
example, the current discussion within Italian Parliament about the so-called 
“stepchild-adoption” by gay couples. Conservative parties in Italy, according to 
moral and ethical basis, are trying to boycott the promulgation of this law.  
US Supreme Court, in its last Obergefell Sentence has declared gay marriage a 
constitutional right and it has noted that – in US constitutional system – when 
constitutional rights and constitutional essentials are at stake, citizens cannot 
wait for legislative procedures before asserting a fundamental right. In that sense, 
Supreme Court remarks that “... the right of the individual is not to be injured by 
the unlawful exercise of governmental power” (Supreme Court 14-556, 2015). 
This sentence represents one of the most interesting examples of public reason 
and one of the most recent and important contributions on constitutional theory. 
The Court remarks that, when individual rights are violated, the Constitution 
requires redress by the Court, notwithstanding the more general value of demo-
cratic decision-making. It entails that the Court is open to individual citizens who 
come to it to vindicate a fundamental right, even when the majority disagrees or 
the legislative refuses to act (Supreme Court 14-556, 2015). 
 
 
                                                        
1 (Ferrara 2014). 
The Debate on Constitutional Courts and Their Authority  
between Legal and Political Constitutionalism 
 
 
 
69 
Bibliography 
 
BELLAMY R. (1996): Pluralism, Liberal Constitutionalism and Democracy: A 
Critique of John Rawls's (Meta)political Liberalis. In: Meadowcroft, J. (eds.): 
The Liberal Political Tradition: Contemporary Reappraisals, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, 77–100. 
BELLAMY, R. (2007): Political Constitutionalism. A Republican Defence of the 
Constitutionality of Democracy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
BELLAMY, R. (2013): The Democratic Qualities of the Courts. A Critical Analysis of 
Three Arguments. In: Representation, 49, 3, 333–346. 
BICKEL, A. (1986): The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of 
Politics, Yale University Press, Yale.  
DWORKIN R. (1985): A Matter of Principle, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
(Mass.) and London (England). 
DWORKIN R. (2006): Justice in Robes, The Belknam Press of Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge (Mass.). 
FERRARA, A. (2014): The Democratic Horizon. Hyperpluralism and the Renewal of 
Political Liberalism, Cambridge Univerity Press, Cambridge (Mass.). 
GOLDONI, M. (2011): Che cos'è il costituzionalismo politico? In: Diritto e questioni 
pubbliche, 10, 1–22. 
GOLDONI, M. (2012): Two Internal Critiques of Political Constitutionalism. In: 
International Journal of Constitutional Law, 10 (4), 926–949. 
MANSBRIDGE, J. (2003): Rethinking Representation. In: The Americal Political 
Sciences Review, 97, 4, 515–528. 
MICHELMAN, F. I. (1999): Brennan and Democracy, Princeton University Press. 
RAWLS, J. (1993): Political Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York. 
TUSHNET, M. (1999): Taking the Constitution Away from the Court, Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey. 
WALDRON, J. (1999): Law and Disagreement, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
WARD, K. – CASTILLO, C. (eds.) (2005): The Judiciary and American Democracy. 
Alexander Bickel, the Counter-majoritarian Difficulty and Contemporary 
Constitutional Theory, State University of New York Press, Albany. 
 
Valerio Fabbrizi 
Departmant of History, Culture and Society 
University of Rome – Tor Vergata 
Via Columbia 
00133 Rome 
Italy 
valerio.fabbrizi@yahoo.it 
